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Abstract
Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment – like damaging
public goods – is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment
we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an
environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which
puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with
constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive
decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurt-
ful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting
the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%. Fe-
male subjects are found to be more inclined to use destructive decisions. Finally,
subjects’ social value orientation turns out to be partly predictive of (at least initial)
destructive choices.
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1 Introduction
Many experimental economic studies have investigated the development of cooperation in a social
dilemma or public good environment, and the effect of punishment mechanisms in this context (for
a recent survey, see Chaudhuri, 2011). In the real world, however, people can often cooperate with or
hurt one another. Interpersonal relationships may even turn sour and induce persistent destructive be-
havior. Repeated and severe conflict is a very real part of human interaction. Examples are neighborhood
conflicts, family feuds, or the destruction of public property by protesters during riots In some studies, a
substantial proportion of individuals engaged in the destruction of others’ earnings, even when rank egal-
itarianism and reciprocity motives where not present and when the destruction was costly (Zizzo, 2003;
Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009). To study whether destructive behavior can be experimentally observed and
modulated in a public good environment we designed a ’fragile public good’ (FPG) game. A key feature
of our FPG game is that it gives as much room for destructive behavior (taking) as for for constructive
behavior (contributing). More formally, it does so by shifting both the (standard) Nash equilibrium and
the status quo – i.e., the initial allocation of tokens to the common account – to the middle of the action
space, with perfect symmetry in the marginal cost of taking and contributing. Contrary to the relatively
few existing public good experiments that allow for an interior Nash equilibrium (see surveys by Laury
and Holt, 2008, and Saijo, 2008), we particularly focus on destructive actions in a repeated context where
subjects can identify the individual decisions of others.
Because framing can influence behavior in public good games (Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Sonnemans
et al., 1998; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; for a survey, see Cookson, 2000), we study the sensitivity
of our findings in two additional treatments, where we separate the status quo from the Nash outcome.
In one case, we move the status quo to a corner so that subjects can only contribute, keeping everything
else the same; this is a case of positive framing which - in light of the literature - may induce subjects
to contribute more. In the other case, we minimally move the Nash outcome away from the status quo
towards taking by introducing a slight payoff asymmetry. Here the Nash choice may be read as aggression
by subjects using the status quo as a reference point and induce more destructive behavior.
Our main questions are: (1) does the FPG game generate destructive behavior and even cases where
behavior equilibrates towards sour relationships?; (2) how does separating the Nash outcome from the
status quo through framing or some minimal payoff asymmetry modulate taking and contributing? After
the experimental design we present our results, followed by a summary of our main findings.
2
2 Experiment
Subjects played the FPG game in fixed dyads over 35 rounds in all three treatments.
2.1 Symmetric Treatment (SYM)
In each round both subjects of a dyad are endowed with a private account holding 7 tokens, earning 10
units each, and a common account holding 14 tokens, earning 10 each for both subjects. Subjects can
contribute to or take up to 7 tokens from the common account, at increasing marginal costs: moving one
token costs 2 units, while the marginal transfer cost of each additional token increases by 21. Earnings are
symmetric around the status quo which coincides with the selfish Nash outcome, while any combination
of contributions of 4 or 5 is socially optimal.
2.2 Framing Treatment (FRAME)
In FRAME subjects have exactly the same strategy space and equivalent earnings, but now they start
each round with 14 tokens in their private accounts and the common account is empty. Thus, to reach
an outcome equivalent to an outcome in SYM, subjects would have to contribute 7 more tokens than
before2. Because now only contributions can be made, this is a case of positive framing.
2.3 Asymmetric Treatment (ASYM)
ASYM differs from SYM in only two respects: tokens in the private account earn subjects 11 units
instead of 10, and the first token transferred in either direction has zero costs. As in FRAME, the Nash
equilibrium does not coincide with the status quo, but now it is the former that moves by prescribing
to take one token out of the common account, while both subjects contributing 5 tokens is the social
optimum3.
Subjects did not see the underlying formulas, but were supplied with graphs illustrating the marginal
effects of every decision for themselves and the other, alongside with payoff tables4.
The public good game was preceded by a test of social value orientation (SVO; see Liebrand and
McClintock, 1988, taken from Van Dijk et al., 2002). This test measures the preferences of subjects for
1Formally, we use the following payoff function, where ci can be positive or negative: VA(cA, cB) =
10(14 + cA + cB) + 10(7− cA)− (|cA|+ c2A). See figure 4 in appendix.
2Payoff function: VA(cA, cB) = 10(cA + cB) + 10(14− cA)− (|cA − 7|+ (cA − 7)2)
3Payoff function: VA(cA, cB) = 10(14 + cA + cB) + 11(7− cA) + |cA| − c2A
4Instructions are available upon request.
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distribution outcomes for themselves and a (generalized) other. We use this measure to see whether it
can explain behavior in the game. Sessions were run in November and December 2012 and April 2013 at
the CREED-lab in Amsterdam. SYM had 130 participants (50% female, 2% unreported gender, average
age 22.2), FRAME 54 (41% female, average age 21.5), and ASYM 80 (43% female, average age 21.5).
The experiment had an additional second part, which we do not cover in this paper. The exchange rate
of units into euros was 700 to one. Subjects earned on average 1.45 euro in the SVO-test and 10.82 euro
in the public good game.
3 Results
Table 1 gives an overview of average contributions, where we adjust for the Nash equilibrium (NE) in
each game by subtracting 7 tokens from results in FRAME and adding 1 to results in ASYM.
Table 1: Average contributions
Average Contribution SYM FRAME ASYM
Overall 2.28 (2.01) 2.07 (1.69) 1.83 (3.3)
First round 1.26 (2.55) -0.02 (2.55) 0.92 (3.06)
Rounds 26-34 2.44 (2.35) 2.49 (3.85) 2.13 (3.85)
Last round (35) 0.68 (2.43) 0.98 (1.81) 0.31 (3.81)
Females 1.94 (2.08) 2.02 (1.85) 0.67 (3.28)
Males 2.61 (1.91) 2.10 (1.59) 2.68 (3.09)
Note: adjusted for the (standard) Nash equilibrium; standard deviation in
parentheses, with dyad averages as separate observations.
Across all rounds average contributions are approximately 2 tokens above the Nash-prediction in all
treatments. The first round, however, reveals a different pattern as the average contribution in FRAME
is significantly lower than in SYM (p = 0.001)5. Because SYM and ASYM are more similar to a taking
game than FRAME (where only contributions are possible), this result contrasts with the general finding
that there are typically lower contributions in taking framings, if there is any difference (Andreoni, 1995;
Sonnemans et al., 1998; Goerg and Walkowitz, 2010). Khadjavi and Lange (2013) have a treatment with
intermediate endowments similar to our SYM and ASYM treatments and find no differences between a
5We use the Mann-Whitney U-test with dyad averages as observations unless otherwise mentioned.
4
contributing frame and this alternative.
Subjects appear to be reluctant to contribute early on in the positive framing treatment, but are
able to compensate for this throughout the game, as the difference stays significant at 1% up until the
fifth round of the game.
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Figure 1: Average contributions, relative to Nash equilibrium
All treatments show an increase in average contributions over time until the (usually observed) sharp
decline at the end which is not significantly different across treatments; see figure 16. A simple regression
shows significant positive time trends. Although the increase is at odds with the general observation
of decreasing cooperation in public good experiments (Ledyard, 1995), it has been observed before
in repeated two-player games using a comparable mechanism (Van Dijk et al., 2002). Interestingly,
comparing SYM and ASYM, the hypothesis of equal contributions is rejected if they are calculated
relative to the status quo (p = 0.035), but not relative to the Nash equilibrium outcome, which may
suggest that the latter is a more important reference point.
6Contributions in the last round are lower than in the ten rounds before (p < 0.01 in all treatments)
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Table 2: Percentage of destructive decisions
Percentage of destructive decisions SYM FRAME ASYM
Overall 11.25% 6.93 % 21.14%
Last round 13.9% 5.36% 25%
Females 15.33% 10.26% 30.25%
Males 7.33 % 4.64% 14.41%
More relevant to the topic of this paper is the occurrence and development of destructive behavior
hurting both partners. Relative to all decisions, destructive decisions count 11% in SYM, 7% in FRAME,
and 21% in ASYM; see table 2. The percentages of subjects choosing below the Nash at least once are,
respectively, 42%, 46%, and 56%. The higher number of destructive decisions in ASYM, despite similar
average contribution levels relative to the Nash outcome (see table 1), suggests distributional differences.
Indeed, the variance of subjects’ decisions is larger in ASYM than in SYM and FRAME in 31 of the 35
rounds (Levene’s test, p < 0.01; see also figure 2). Interestingly, this difference only becomes significant
from the third round onwards, which indicates that it is at least partly driven by the dynamics in
the game. Not only the variance across subjects, but also the variance within each subject’s set of 35
decisions is greater in ASYM7. Summing the number of destructive contributions of each dyad we find a
difference only between SYM and ASYM (p = 0.094). Interestingly, the generally higher level of conflict
observed in ASYM is also confirmed by the observation that the percentage of destructive decisions in
the last round (when there are no strategic considerations present) is higher in ASYM than in the other
treatments, and even a bit higher than the overall percentage in this treatment.
7Means of within-subject variances: 2.57 in SYM, 2.54 in FRAME, and 4.59 in ASYM. The differences
between SYM and ASYM (p < 0.001) and FRAME vs ASYM (p = 0.038) are significant.
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Figure 2: Between-subject variance across treatments/rounds
It appears that sour relationships do indeed develop in our FPG game. We take as criterion that
both partners in a dyad make destructive decisions in at least 5 of the last 10 rounds, which happened
with 8% of the dyads in SYM and with 18% in ASYM, but with none in FRAME (0%). Figure 3 shows
two examples of equilibration towards a sour relationship in SYM.
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Figure 3: Examples of sour relationships in SYM
Interestingly, we also find evidence of a gender effect. The figures in table 2 suggest that female
subjects use the option to destroy more frequently. Separating the dyads into female-female (FF),
female-male (FM), and male-male (MM) groups we find that the groups with only female participants
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show a significantly higher average number of destructive decisions and a lower average contribution
level in SYM and ASYM, but not in FRAME, where subjects can only contribute8. This is at odds with
Fujimoto and Park (2010), who find higher contributions from women in a taking treatment, but not in
a giving treatment. Our result is consistent, though, with findings in the literature on public good games
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2013) that females seem to react stronger to modifications
in framing and other game features than men.
Table 3: Correlations with SVO (Spearman)
Correlation with SVO SYM FRAME ASYM
Contribution first round 0.30∗∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.31∗∗∗
Contribution first 5 rounds 0.11 0.31∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
Average contribution 0.06 0.29∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
Number of destructive decisions 0.04 -0.24∗ -0.34∗∗∗
Note: ∗ : p ≤ 0.1; ∗∗ : p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p ≤ 0.01
Our final result is that the social value orientation (SVO) of subjects correlates with their (overall)
average contributions in the FRAME and ASYM treatments, but only with first round contributions in
SYM9. It appears that in the alternative versions of the game the subjects’ SVO had a stronger influence
on the development of their relationship with their partner, and is predictive of the number of destructive
decisions, although the correlation coefficients are still relatively low.
4 Conclusion
This study shows that substantial destructive behavior can occur even in a public good environment
once the opportunity to do so is present. Our baseline Fragile Public Good game – offering players equal
room to take from or contribute to a public good, against fully symmetric marginal costs – showed more
than 10% destructive decisions. While, unexpectedly, positive framing had significant negative effects on
contributing in the early rounds of the game, players compensated for that later on, such that on average
8FF vs. MM in SYM: number of destructive decisions - p = 0.017; average contributions - p = 0.046;
FF vs. MM in ASYM: p = 0.041 and p = 0.011. In ASYM the difference in average contribution between
FF and FM dyads is also significant (p = 0.025). See figure 5 in appendix.
9We exclude subjects whose answers in the different questions making up this measure were below
a threshold for answer consistency, a vector length of 700 or less of the maximum 1,000 (Liebrand and
McClintock, 1988), and had to exclude four subjects due to technological problems, leaving 123 subjects
in SYM, 52 in FRAME, and 70 in ASYM
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fewer destructive decisions were observed. Introducing a slight asymmetry by minimally separating the
selfish Nash outcome from the initial status quo towards taking one token sharply increased the share
of destructive decisions to more than 20% (even in the last round). The FPG game further showed
that destructive behavior need not only occur incidentally or intermittently but may also lead to sour
relationships, characterized by equilibration towards persistent destructive behavior. Finally, we found
evidence of a gender effect, with female subjects being more inclined to make destructive decisions, and
that people’s social value orientation is predictive of (at least initial) destructive choices in the game.
Appendix
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 84 94 104 114 124 134 144 154 164 174 184 194 204 214 224
6 98 108 118 128 138 148 158 168 178 188 198 208 218 228 238
5 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250
4 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250 260
3 128 138 148 158 168 178 188 198 208 218 228 238 248 258 268
2 134 144 154 164 174 184 194 204 214 224 234 244 254 264 274
1 138 148 158 168 178 188 198 208 218 228 238 248 258 268 278
0 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280
1 138 148 158 168 178 188 198 208 218 228 238 248 258 268 278
2 134 144 154 164 174 184 194 204 214 224 234 244 254 264 274
3 128 138 148 158 168 178 188 198 208 218 228 238 248 258 268
4 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250 260
5 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250
6 98 108 118 128 138 148 158 168 178 188 198 208 218 228 238
7 84 94 104 114 124 134 144 154 164 174 184 194 204 214 224
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Figure 4: Earnings of player 1, SYM
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Figure 5: Average contributions separated by gender, adjusted relative to (standard)
Nash Equilibrium
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